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CYBER EMBARGO: COUNTERING THE INTERNET JIHAD
Gregory S. McNeal*
If you are a young Muslim male, even a doctor, with a PC in Egypt, the
Gulf states, Somalia, Morocco or Glasgow, as always with the Web you
are marinating your mind in its content, and the content here is homicide
on a mass scale. The answer-technical or political-is not obvious to me.
But the one unacceptable answer is doing nothing.
Daniel Henninger l
INTRODUCTION
As Daniel Henninger pointed out shortly after the attempted July
2007 Glasgow and London terrorist attacks, the solution to the problem of
jihadist websites is not obvious. Nevertheless, doing nothing is no longer
acceptable. Terrorists are engaged in an online jihad, characterized by the
use of the internet to fundraise, distribute messages and directives, recruit,
and proselytize. Although it is impossible to eliminate the presence of ter-
rorists on the internet, this article details a proposal that would have a
marked impact on the presence of terrorists on the internet. Using existing
statutes, it is possible to regionalize terrorist websites, limiting them to a
small number of countries from which they may receive internet services.
Once the terrorist message is limited to a particular region, a modification of
current laws can allow for a cyber embargo on jihadist websites and their
supporters. These efforts, coupled with diplomatic cooperation, can further
the attempt to curb the impact of jihadist websites, while simultaneously
increasing the ability of governments to monitor these websites and, when
necessary, shut them down.
This article is a thought piece, intended to create debate about my
proposal. I have not exhaustively addressed all of the constitutional and
policy issues associated with my proposal; instead, I hope this piece will
serve as a platform for future scholarship. In this article, I outline my pro-
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posal for countering the internet jihad by using, as an example, the active
and official website of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a designated terrorist
organization. While I frequently reference PIJ, the principles I articulate
have relevance to any other terrorist's website. In Part One I provide a brief
overview of the status of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and its brazen efforts to
stay online despite government countermeasures. I outline a three-step
process by which the PIJ web presence, and others like it, can be eliminated.
Step one involves the use of the existing material support statute. Step two
recommends the creation of a cyber embargo by modifying existing statutes
to create a non-criminal "material supporter" designation that will prevent
U.S. companies from conducting business with designated material suppor-
ters. Finally, step three involves diplomatic efforts to globalize the reach of
the techniques detailed in steps one and two. Part One also explains the
practical effect of each step of my proposed process on the official website
of PIJ.
In Part Two of this article, I detail the threat posed by "cyber jihad."
I explain how terrorists use the internet to recruit, train for attacks, and
coordinate those attacks. I also describe the clear advantages terrorist organ-
izations enjoy by using websites. This sets the stage for a discussion of the
current statutory framework, which, to date, has only enjoyed moderate
success.
In Part Three, I move beyond the threat and explore the legal and
policy implications of using existing statutes to eliminate the web presence
of terrorist organizations. I also detail the limitations of the current statute
and prepare the reader for a discussion of how, with slight modifications,
the existing statutory and policy framework can significantly diminish the
advantages terrorist organizations enjoy through their web presence.
In Part Four, I present the critical next step in countering the cyber
jihad. I explain the advantages of creating a cyber embargo on companies
that provide "material support" to terrorist organizations, but that, for legal
or policy reasons, may be beyond the reach of the material support statute.
The creation of a cyber embargo rests upon a non-criminal "material sup-
porter" designation that will prevent American companies from conducting
business with designated "material supporters." In essence, this process
involves the creation of virtual "persona non grata." I also detail the diplo-
matic efforts necessary to globalize the reach of this counter-terrorism strat-
egy. Through cooperation with foreign governments, loopholes in the jihad-
ist web presence can be closed and terrorist organizations can be forced to a
limited number of potential host countries.
I conclude the article by discussing the implications of following
my approach, and the new counterterrorism opportunities it presents.
[Vol. 39:789
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I. THE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD EXAMPLE
PIJ is a designated terrorist organization,2 responsible for the deaths
of Americans and others.3 They brazenly boasted in 2006 that the FBI could
not shut them down,4 and their boasts, thus far, have proven true. In January
2006, PIJ's official website was present on the web through the support of
three U.S. companies. After a public shaming campaign led by Internet Ha-
ganah, a web based watchdog group,5 PIJ changed network providers. As of
May 2006, however, PIJ maintained six active websites, five of which were
based on servers in the United States, with six American companies in-
volved in keeping those sites online.6 A further check conducted at the time
of this article's publication showed that the official websites of PIJ were
still operational, although they have now located all of their internet servic-
es outside the United States, obtaining network services from businesses in
Malaysia.
Some see the above example as support for the argument that ef-
forts to counter the presence of terrorists on the internet are a fruitless en-
deavor. At first blush, the example of PIJ seems to support this assertion-
despite actions taken to shut PIJ down in January and May of 2006 the cy-
ber jihadists almost immediately resurfaced to mock authorities. 7 Neverthe-
less, critics should not be so quick to dismiss efforts to shut down jihadist
websites. The web, like other battlefields in the struggle against terrorist
organizations, is dynamic, and efforts that keep the terrorists moving im-
pose costs on their operations. These costs include preventing the distribu-
tion of the terrorist message, disrupting the organization's regular activities,
and damaging the morale of the organization. 8 Moreover, as the PIJ exam-
ple illustrates, efforts to counter the terrorist presence on the web can force
such organizations to overseas internet service providers, thus limiting their
2 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/41055.pdf.
3 Ali Waked, Ahiya Raved, & Efrat Weiss, 5 Killed in Hadera Bombing, YNET NEWS,
Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3159743,00.html.
4 New PIJ Site Unveiled, and a Review of All Active PIJ Sites, INTERNET HAGANAH, May
11, 2006, http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005604.html [hereinafter PIJ Site] ("After issuing a
communiqu6 promising that they would show the FBI that they could not be kept offline, US
designated Terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad has finally unveiled their saraya.ps site,
representing their operational/terrorist unit-the Saraya al-Quds Brigade. Despite the Pales-
tinian domain name, it is operating on a server in the USA.")
See Internet Haganah, http://haganah.org.il (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Internet Haganah].
6 PIJ Site, supra note 4.
7 See supra 4-6.
8 BoAz GANOR, THE COUNTERTERRORISM PUZZLE 102 (2005).
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host options and increasing the likelihood that authorities will be able to
track them.
Step one in the process of shutting down a website such as PIJ is to
use shaming techniques and the threat of criminal sanctions to stop U.S.
companies from providing services to a designated terrorist organization.
Websites such as Internet Haganah posted the details of U.S. companies
who were providing services to PIJ as part of a shaming campaign.9 The
website encouraged readers to contact those U.S. companies and demand
that they stop supporting terrorists. The U.S. companies have more at stake
than just their reputation. Current statutes make it a crime to provide materi-
al support to terrorist organizations, and the list of prohibited forms of sup-
port includes the provision of computer services. Shortly after the shaming
campaign, with its attendant potential for criminal liability, the PIJ website
shifted its operation to overseas service providers that are beyond the reach
of U.S. laws and less susceptible to shaming techniques. As a result, the PIJ
website is still operating today.
The second step to further isolate and eventually shut down the PIJ
website is the most critical one. As the facts detailed in step one illustrate,
current laws and techniques are limited, and terrorist organizations are quick
to adapt and avoid the reach of shaming techniques and U.S. laws. Never-
theless, once terrorist organizations make their home outside the United
States, they must still rely on the support of service providers in their new
jurisdiction. While the terrorist organization itself may not be deterred by
U.S. efforts, their service providers are vulnerable to commercial pressure
and the desire to maintain their business-the majority of which likely
comes from non-terrorist clientele. These service providers are the critical
and weakest link in the terrorist's web presence. Accordingly, a cyber em-
bargo is the quickest and most effective way to cease their support of terror-
ist organizations. Such an embargo focuses on those service providers who
are providing material support to PIJ in the form of web services.
The example of PIJ demonstrates the necessity of this cyber embar-
go. After being forced off of U.S. network service providers, PIJ now rece-
ives an IP address and connection to the internet from a Malaysian network
service provider, Time Net Central.10 They also receive registrar services
from Time Telekomm," a major telecommunications company in Malay-
sia. 1 2 I propose a modification to existing statutes to create a new material
9 See PI Site, supra note 4.
10 See generally Asia Pacific Network Information Centre, http://wq.apnic.net/apnic-
bin/whois.pl (last visited Jul. 17, 2007) (providing a searchable membership database of Asia
Pacific Network Information Centre members).
" See generally id.
12 See Time dotCom, http://www.time.com.my/corporate/index.asp (last visited Sept. 10,
2007).
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supporter designation. U.S. companies and persons under this approach will
be forbidden from doing business with a designated material supporter. The
practical result of such a designation will be to create a cyber embargo, cut-
ting off streams of income to overseas companies due to their affiliation
with terrorist organizations.
With a cyber embargo in place, companies that support terrorists
will be forced to choose between either losing all commercial services from
the United States or continuing to provide services to the terrorist organiza-
tion. The result in the case of PIJ is obvious. If Time Telekomm, a major
international telecommunications company, were designated as a material
supporter, then all U.S. commercial services would be cut off, including
internet and financial services. In the face of this potential loss of income,
Time Telekomm would likely cease providing services to PIJ immediately.
Moreover, the network service provider Time Net Central, may also have
ties to U.S. commercial activity, and would be reluctant to find itself desig-
nated a material supporter.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that Time Net Central is a much
smaller organization and may not be deterred by a material supporter desig-
nation. As such, a further step is necessary to isolate these terrorist organi-
zations and their overseas webhosts. The third step involves diplomatic ef-
forts to standardize the creation of "designated material supporter" lists by
urging nations to adopt the list and implement necessary domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms. Such an adoption will expand the number of nations
participating in a cyber embargo, and will foreclose overseas safe havens
for terrorist websites. In the example above, Time Net Central, as a small,
mostly domestic company, may not be concerned if commercial activity
between it and the United States is disrupted. Time Net Central will likely
be very concerned, however, if Malaysia has a similar designation process
that cuts commercial ties between itself and a major Malaysian company
such as Time Telekomm, for example. Thus, expanding the cyber embargo
is key because as PIJ continues to shift its operations to countries it believes
are safe havens the cyber embargo will continue to isolate them geographi-
cally.
II. RECRUITMENT, COORDINATION, TRATNING, AND CYBER JIHAD
Overview of Websites, Webhosts, and the Internet Jihad
Why should we be concerned with the presence of terrorists on the
intemet? Unlike cyberterrorism, which is the use of computers to attack
networks and create chaos, the cyber jihad is information presented on be-
half of terrorist organizations, and is seemingly less threatening than cyber-
terrorism. There is no evidence to indicate that cyberterrorist techniques
2007-2008]
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have been used for serious destructive activity. 13 On the other hand, the cy-
ber jihad can be used for many activities that directly support war. 14 For
example, Joseph Shahda, an expert in cyberterrorism, explains that
"[t]errorist leaders including Bin Laden have stated that 'media Jihad' is as
important as 'battlefield Jihad' and in this case the most common and po-
werful medium for the terrorists 'media Jihad' is the internet."" The inter-
net is used on a daily basis to support the ongoing jihad. Via the internet,
terrorist groups set up operation centers, raise money, recruit, spread propa-
ganda, and communicate their ideologies. All of this is accomplished with
minimal effort and resources, and without geographical limitation. Thus, the
internet jihad is quite successful and has serious consequences. Officials
would not allow PIJ or other terrorist organizations to operate a downtown
recruiting center or headquarters; similarly, terrorists should not be allowed
to engage in the same activity on the internet.
Recruiting and Communicating the Ideology
The internet provides an inexpensive recruiting tool for terrorists to
win supporters and members from any part of the world.
Because the internet can be accessed easily by those at home or in
public places, the number of potential recruits has gone up exponentially
since the rise of the internet. Websites and chat rooms provide an instant
connection between recruiters and interested sympathizers.
Technology has made instantaneous recruitment simple. With the
internet capabilities of digital imaging and video, terrorists can broadcast
powerful messages to a mass audience of sympathetic viewers. 16 Bandwidth
costs continue to decrease, thereby reducing streaming video costs. 17 Fur-
thermore, terrorists can use browsers to check language settings and direct
the viewer to a site customized to his language and culture.' 8 Interested
13 See Joshua Green, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 8,
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211 .green.html.
14 See Timothy L. Thomas, Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of "Cyberplanning,"
33 PARAMETERS, Spring 2003 at 112, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf ("[The internet] provides terrorists with anonymity, com-
mand and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack
options.").
15 Jerry Gordon, Fighting Internet Jihad: An Interview with Joseph Shahda, NEW ENGLISH
REvIEw (2007), http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfn/frm/l 1995/secid/ 11995.
16 Seeid. at 114.
17 See generally Scott Pelley, Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online, CBS NEWS,
Mar. 4, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/O3/O2/60minutes/main2531
546.shtml (showing the presence of the growing practice of posting videos on the Internet).
18 Patrick S. Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies
34 (Jun. 2002) (unpublished monograph, on file with the School of Advanced Military Stu-
dies).
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viewers can then contact the terrorists by way of the contact information
listed on the web. Once contact is established, terrorists can assess and re-
cruit members for their cause.' 9 Through steganography, the process of em-
bedding messages in graphic files, terrorists can use their websites to pro-
vide instructions to their recruits.20
Again, anonymity plays a large role in the internet's efficacy as a
terrorist tool. The anonymity of the internet has been found to foster higher
levels of violence in people.21 This rise in violent feelings is understandable,
when one considers that anonymity allows people to act freely, unfettered
by a fear of consequences. Terrorists can encourage these feelings of vi-
olence, drawing people to their cause.
Additionally, terrorists are using the internet to target younger
members of society. According to a congressional report, "web sites are
often flashy and colorful, apparently designed to appeal to a computer
savvy, media-saturated, video game-addicted generation. 2 2 One such ex-
ample was a website that presented the video game "Quest for Bush." The
object of the game is to conquer Americans in the name of the jihad. Levels
of the game include "Jihad Growing Up" and "American's Hell." Other
sites play youth-oriented music like rap and hip-hop.23
With the advent of internet recruitment, terrorists have been able to
lower their costs while customizing their search for potential members on a
global level. Furthermore, terrorists can stir web visitors into action by rais-
ing their feelings of violence and indignation. Thus, the internet has in-
creased the pool of recruits for terrorist organizations.
Related to recruiting, one of the jihadists' main goals is to pass on
their ideology and provide a sense of community and belonging.24 Because
the internet is capable of generating a virtual community, jihadists can reach
supporters in any corner of the world. Ultimately, the community streng-
thens the bond of individuals to the group.25
On the internet, communication is not unidirectional. Rather than
issuing a statement that reaches group members, jihadist leaders can invite
19 Id. at 37.
20 Thomas, supra note 15, at 119.
21 Beverley Lumpkin, Islamic Extremists Say Web as Vital to Them as AK-47, SEATLE
TIMES, May 3, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003
691528_webterrorists03.html.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, JIHAD ONLINE: ISLAMIC TERRORISTS AND THE INTERNET
15 (2002), http://www.adl.org/intemet/jihad.asp [hereinafter ADLI.
25 Hanna Rogan, JIHADISM ONLINE -A STUDY OF How AL-QAIDA AND RADICAL ISLAMIST
GRouPs USE THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES 25 (Mar. 20, 2006), available at
http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf.
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interactive participation.26 By doing so, leaders can answer questions, ad-
dress issues, and engage in discussions to create unity within the group.
Once unity has been established, leaders can invite small groups of people
to exchange strategies and work together toward the same goal. These strat-
egies are often aimed at moving against the United States. One example is a
jihadist Yahoo! message board that presented a strategy to compel United
States-led coalition forces to leave Iraq.27
In another, more recent example, six Muslim men living in the
United States were charged with plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey.
28
The men had planned to sneak onto the base as military personnel. The ac-
cused were united via the internet, where they all downloaded videos of
Osama bin Laden preaching inspirational jihadist messages. 29 Their capture
resulted from a tip by a store clerk who was hired by the men to dub video -
of their training and practice attacks onto a digital disk for internet use.
30
The internet has proven to be a simple, effective way for jihadists to
communicate their ideology and create strong communities of supporters
that strategize together. With its ability to eliminate geographical con-
straints, the internet allows jihadists from abroad to unite and work together
with those on the homefront. The Fort Dix plot demonstrated that jihadists,
with intent to contribute to the international cause, could join and construct
a plot within U.S. borders.
Official websites of al Qaeda and other designated terrorist groups
are not just hosted in the Arab world. In fact, many are registered or hosted
in Europe, Asia, or the United States. These sites offer articles that condemn
America, give biographies of Islamists killed in battle, and relate biased
accounts of the current war in Afghanistan. They communicate an ideology
with the intent to recruit members to the terrorist organization's cause.
Command and Control
Beyond recruiting, terrorist websites can also act as virtual com-
mand and control centers. 31 The ease of accessibility and information ex-
change make websites ideal for serving some of the administrative functions
26 See id.
27 Id. at 24.
28 See Posting of Fort Dix Plot: Complaint and Summary by Gregory McNeal to AIDP
Blog, http://aidpblog.org/2007/05/08/fort-dix-plot-complaint-and-summary (May 8, 2007,
11:25a.m. EST) (citations omitted).
29 Six Men Arrested in Plot to Attack New Jersey's Fort Dix (PBS television broadcast
May 8, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/govemment-prgrams/j an-
june07/fortdix_05-08.html.
30 See id.
31 Thomas, supra note 14, at 117.
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of terrorist organizations. Terrorists are able to exert control over their mis-
sions through the internet with few geographic and communication limita-
tions. A terrorist in Iran, for example, can coordinate attacks in the United
States from afar. The convenience of the internet has made terrorist opera-
,,32tions "cheaper, faster, and more secure. Terrorist organizations are dy-
namic, and the internet has become the medium of choice for centralizing
their operations. Communication and training is much easier to accomplish
with the speed of the internet, and without the limitations of geography.
Prior to the age of the intemet, terrorists were limited to communi-
cating with each other by way of available electronics, such as telephones or
radios. As a result, they were always at risk of being monitored by electron-
ic surveillance tools, such as wiretaps.33 The internet solved that problem by
providing anonymity. For example, complex encryption keys, nearly im-
possible to break, mask terrorist messages. Terrorists can use spamming
tools that hide messages in bulk commercial email. Network accounts can
be easily set up under false names, and many internet access locations have
anonymous logins. Often, hosting internet service providers are unaware of
their clients' site content.34
Training Sites
Terrorists also use websites as training sites by posting training ma-
terials online.35 For example, the training pamphlet, How Can I Train My-
selffor Jihad, was originally posted on Azzam.com, a website run by a Brit-
ish company and affiliated with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Osa-
ma Bin Laden.36 The document provided information on various aspects of
battle, including martial arts, survival training, and firearm use.37
The Azzam.com subscriber list included Said Bahaj, who is be-
lieved to be a key planner in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which
peripherally demonstrates the use and effectiveness of internet training
32 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST. & THE UNiv. OF VA.
CRITICAL INCIDENT ANALYSIS GROUP, NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A COUNTER-
STRATEGY 1 (2000), available at http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/intemet/ciag/home.
cfm.
" See id.
34 Thomas, supra note 14, at 115.
35 See generally Gabriel Weimann, www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the
Internet, INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REPORT 116 (2004), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr 16.pdf (explaining many ways terrorist groups
use the internet, including training purposes).
36 See Stephanie Gruner & Gautam Naik, Extremist Sites Under Heightened Security,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 7, 2001, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-530855. html.
37 Violence Policy Center, Firearms Training for Jihad in America (2001),
http://www.vpc.org/studies/ ihad.htm.
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sites.38 Another example of detailed online training comes from al Battar, al
Qaeda's online journal. At one point, the constantly relocating al Battar was
posted on www.alm2sda.net, a jihadist internet forum.39 Topics included
methods of intelligence gathering, discussions of bin Laden's political ge-
nius, and explanations of public kidnapping procedures. 40 One article pro-
vided a "how to" guide for dealing with hostages, instructing site visitors to
"[s]eparate the young people from the old, the women and the children. The
young people have more strength, hence their ability to resist is high. The
security forces must be killed instantly. This prevents others from showing
resistance."Al
Dozens of sites feature information on how to build chemical and
explosive weapons. The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook, posted on the
official Hamas website, included instructions for homemade poisons, poi-
sonous gases, and other deadly materials for use in terrorist attacks.42 Other
websites, like alneda.com, offered motivational tidbits, religious support,
and strategies for attack. Additionally, the media has speculated that such
sites are written in Arabic to direct al Qaeda to other sites. 43 Some websites
even trained readers to wage attacks through the computer system itself. For
example, the site 7hj.7hj.com taught viewers how to damage computer sys-
tems with viruses.
44
Terrorists are able to run training websites more effectively by us-
ing video demonstrations. Videos train viewers to make explosive devices,
gunpowder, mines, and suicide bomber vests. One website that featured
links to such videos, Al Qalah, claimed responsibility for several terrorist
attacks.45 The website also featured Arabic voiceovers and written instruc-
38 See id.
39 Stephen Ulph, Al-Battar Number 22 Released, 1 TERRORISM Focus 8, Nov. 12, 2004,
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2368849.
40 See id.; see also Kidnapping the Focus of Al Battar Issue No. 10, SITE Institute, May
24, 2004, http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications3804&Category=
publications&Subcategory=0.
41 Laura Mansfield, Chechen Terrorists Follow al-Qaida Manual, WORLDNETDAILY,
Sept. 4, 2004, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=40298.
42 Posting of Manual for Poisons and Chemical Gases Published on Hamas Website, Free
Republic, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/816520/posts (Jan. 3, 2003 16:30 PST).
43 See, e.g., Paul Eedle, Terrorism.com, GUARDIAN, Jul. 17, 2002, at G2, available at
www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/comment/story/0, 1 1447,756638,00.html.
44 See Yossi Melman, Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War, HA'ARETZ, Sep. 17, 2002, available
at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/786923/posts.
45 Anti-Defamation League, Terrorist Training Videos Appear Online,
http://www.adl.org/mainTerrorism/terrorist-training_video_82205.htm (last visited Aug.
22, 2005).
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tions. In keeping with the anonymity of the internet, the videos did not show
any faces.46
The example of "Irahabi007," also known as Younis Tsouli, sup-
ports these conclusions. Tsouli was an information technology student in
London, and was one of al-Qaida's most notorious cyber facilitators.47 He
distributed online weapons manuals and videotapes of bombings and be-
headings.48 He taught seminars on how to operate online anonymously, and
how to hack into vulnerable websites and upload material onto them.49
The internet serves as the ultimate center of operations for terrorist
organizations. Not only does the internet provide terrorist organization web-
sites with a safe location to train and communicate with their members, but
it also provides global access. This kind of access facilitates fundraising, as
well as recruiting, and allows propaganda to be spread all over the world in
a very inexpensive and efficient manner.
Fundraising
Terrorist organizations use the internet to raise funds for their mur-
derous activities. They rely on donations given through charities and non-
governmental organizations that conduct business online. Terrorist groups
often establish websites that front as charities, but serve as fundraising cen-
ters for their cause. For example, Al Qaeda employs charities under the
guise of Islamic humanitarianism. 50 The Benevolence International Founda-
tion (BIF), based in the United States, touts itself as an organization that
provides relief to war-tom areas. BIF gave $600,000 to Al-Qaeda trainees
and funded activities for Osama bin Laden and other Islamists involved with
the September 11, 2001 attack.5
Contributors are often unaware that the ultimate destinations of
their donations are terrorist organizations. Moreover, terrorists have become
adroit at soliciting donations. The webmaster can pull demographic infor-
mation from online questionnaires that contributors fill out when donating
to the charity. They then use this information to send out emails tailored to
the contributor in the hope of gaining more sympathy and, ultimately, con-
tributions.52
46 Id.
47 See A World Wide Web of Terror, THE ECONOMIST, July 14, 2007, at 28 ("lrhabi007 was
a central figure in enabling al-Qaeda.").
41 See id.
49 Id.
50 Thomas, supra note 14, at 116.
51 ADL, supra note 24, at 15.
52 Weimann, supra note 35, at 7-8 (2004).
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The example of Irahbi007 supports these conclusions. Two days be-
fore his arrest, IrahbiOO7 had the following encrypted web chat with a col-
league:
Abuthaabit: This media work, I am telling you, is very important. Very,
very, very, very.
Irhabi007: I know, I know.
Abuthaabit: Because a lot of the funds brothers are getting is because they
are seeing stuff like this coming out. Imagine how many people have gone
[to Iraq] after seeing the situation because of the videos. Imagine how
many of them could have been shaheed [martyrs] as well.53
This admission confirms that the internet is one of the weapons ter-
rorists use to raise funds and personnel to aid their cause.
Executions and Propaganda
Terrorist organizations have also begun to employ websites as a
form of information warfare. Their websites can disperse inaccurate infor-
mation that has far-reaching consequences. Because internet postings are
not regulated sources of news, they can reflect any viewpoint, truthful or
not. Thus, readers tend to consider internet items to be fact, and stories can
go unchecked for some time. 54 Furthermore, streaming video and pictures of
frightening scenes can support and magnify these news stories. As a result,
the internet is a powerful and effective tool for spreading propaganda.
The usefulness of the internet for propaganda is similar to its use-
fulness for operation headquartering. Anonymity and global capability per-
mit terrorists to spread their message quickly to all areas of the world with
minimal risk of detection. Al Qaeda's use of the internet provides a good
illustration. Rather than using official websites that are easier to pinpoint
and shut down, al Qaeda uses semi-official sites to broadcast its propagan-
da. The people who maintain such sites are al Qaeda members or suppor-
ters, and they are almost impossible to identify.55 Registering websites can
be accomplished easily with fabricated information, and the ability of terror-
ists to remain anonymous lends to the allure of using the internet.
Azzam.com, an al Qaeda site, features more than four-dozen flatter-
ing biographies of foreign Mujahideen who were killed in the jihad. Many
of these biographies are supplemented with images, audio, and video, and
53 A World Wide Web of Terror, supra note 47.
54 Thomas, supra note 14, at 116.
55 ADL, supra note 24, at 12.
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they aim to inspire readers to join the cause. 6 Other al Qaeda websites, such
as jehad.net, give interested readers their perspective on the conflict in Afg-
hanistan. Using such websites, Al Qaeda is able to broadcast a biased ver-
sion of the news, while claiming to be a news source. One such example
involves an insurgent "black propaganda" operation called "Lee's Life for
Lies";
[t]his operation involved fabricating the false history of American soldier
Lee Kendall, whose USB flash drive was found by insurgents. The insur-
gents utilized the information contained in the USB to write a fake letter
that described the desperate situation of the foreign soldier in Iraq and the
existence of abuses and unpunished war crimes.
57
Al Qaeda can, thus, downplay negative stories about unsuccessful
attacks and highlight unfair treatment of Afghan (and other) civilians by
Americans. These sites commonly use a tactic in which they report high
death tolls for American troops to rally support. 58 In reality, however, death
tolls are hundreds of times smaller than the sites claim. These tactics make
readers and supporters believe that al Qaeda stands strong against the Unit-
ed States.59
Many sites also feature statements made by Osama bin Laden or al
Qaeda. Some post public executions, like that of kidnapped American Nick
Berg.60 In fact, an increasing number of websites have included graphic
video testimonials of suicide bombers.61 These websites, which tap into
visual imagery, are likely to have more power to connect with their au-
dience. A recent report from The United States Military Academy at West
Point's Combating Terrorism Center reinforces this conclusion, stating
"[v]isual imagery provides a key aspect of the terrorists' message in that it
56 See generally Azzam Publications, Jihad Stories: Stories of Foreign Mujahideen Killed
in Jihad, http://d.lasphost.com/TawheedJihad/Azzam/storieshome.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2007) (providing links to biographies of individuals killed in jihad).
57 Manuel R. Torres Soriano, Jihadist Propaganda and Its Audiences: A Change of
Course?, PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?
option=com-rokzine&view=article&id=8 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
58 See generally, Jonathan Forman, Defeat in the "Information Battle Space," NAT'L
REVIEW ONLINE, May 17, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MWI3MGFiN2
EyODIiODRiMGI1ZTJiYTMxYTM4OGRiYzA=&w=MA (arguing that civilian death tolls
are exaggerated by the Taliban and their allies to create the impression that coalition troops
kill large numbers of civilians).
59 ADL, supra note 24, at 13.
60 Pepe Escobar, The War of the Snuff Films, ASIA TIMES, May 13, 2004, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front-Page/FE l3A02.html.
61 See ADL, supra note 24, at 20.
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allows these groups to paint a picture of their objectives, their enemies, and
their strategy through graphics, photographs, and symbols."
62
In light of the clear advantages terrorist organizations enjoy by us-
ing websites to recruit, coordinate, and enhance their operations, new and
creative ways to diminish the terrorist web presence are necessary. To date,
extant efforts have enjoyed only moderate success. Nevertheless, with slight
modifications, the existing statutory and policy framework can markedly
diminish the advantages terrorist organizations enjoy on the internet.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE EXISTING STATUTORY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
AND ISOLATING THE THREAT
Overview of Internet Architecture and Jihadist Techniques
The internet's ubiquity and resilience allows for seamless global
communications thereby making it difficult to control its use by terrorists.
The interconnected nature of the web means that for a website to operate
effectively, it must rely on intermediaries to carry any individual message.
These intermediaries are U.S. and foreign companies that support the inter-
net jihad by providing domain names to, and hosting the websites of terror-
ist organizations. Some may be doing so unwittingly, while others may be
turning a blind eye. The internet jihad, however, can be countered by enlist-
ing corporate cooperation, and where cooperation fails, sanctioning compa-
nies that support terrorist organizations.
The first step is to identify terrorist websites; some claim to be "the
official" website, while others merely post supportive information. While
the task of identifying terrorist websites is difficult, small, private watchdog
groups that police the internet for potential threats are emerging. 63 As pre-
viously mentioned, one particularly well-known watchdog website is Inter-
net Haganah, run by Aaron Weisburd. 64 Keeping his costs low, Weisburd
operates out of his home office and has a network of supporters who contri-
bute time and money to the voluntary counterterrorism endeavor.65 By
going undercover as an interested party, Weisburd is able to discover jihad-
ist sites that pose a high risk. Once Weisburd locates terrorist activity, he
62 U.S. Military Academy: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Islamic Im-
agery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda, http://www.universityofinilitary
intelligence.us/mipb/article.asp?articlelD=499&issuelD=38 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
63 See e.g., Globalterroralert.com, http://www.globalterroralert.com/about.htm (last visited
Sept. 17, 2007); Homelandsecurity.com, http://www.homelandsecurity.com (last visited
Sept. 17, 2007); Counterterrorism Blog, http://www.counterterrorismblog.org. (last visited
Sept. 17, 2007).
64 See Internet Haganah, supra note 5.
65 Nadya Labi, Jihad 2.0, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Jul./Aug. 2006, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200607/online-jihad.
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tracks down the host of the website and either shames the internet service
provider (ISP) into shutting the site down, or provides the information to the
appropriate authorities who can, in turn, notify the ISP.
66
While this solution is beneficial given its low cost, Weisburd's me-
thod has its weaknesses. The main problem is that when he shuts a website
down, that same website will reappear somewhere else.67 The terrorists who
run these sites merely move to a new ISP. Because ISPs are numerous, the
time-consuming tracking process must begin all over again. Unfortunately,
jihadists are often able to jump from site to site much more quickly than the
sites can be shut down.
Moreover, Jihadists have gone one step further. Not only do they
switch ISPs, but they also take on new domains. Finding new domains is a
fairly easy task. Al Qaeda, for example, uses mailing lists, chat rooms, and
sympathizer websites that immediately broadcast the new domain name to
al Qaeda members. Because these sources are password protected and fairly
secure, jihadists ensure that only their group receives the information.68
As in the example of PIJ, once a terrorist organization is shut down
by its ISP the jihadists pack up and move to a new ISP. There are many
ISPs in business, and thus relocating the website is akin to finding a needle
in a haystack. Nevertheless, terrorist organizations are interested in recruit-
ing, spreading their message, fundraising, and coordinating their efforts.
Thus, a website that cannot be found does not benefit them, and therein lies
the first of their weaknesses.
Moreover, all website or domain names (*.com, *.gov, *.org, etc.)
are controlled by a domain name registrar, and the domain name servers
maintain directory maps to each domain. Simply put, to create a website
with a domain name, one must register and pay for it. Once the name is reg-
istered, the company that owns the name can keep track of which ISP is
hosting their domain name.69 When PIJ decided to operate their website,
they selected the domain name saraya.ps. This domain name, like all do-
main names, is owned by a company called a domain name registrar (DNR).
Different companies own the rights to a unique set of domain names, so PIJ
had to approach the appropriate company to purchase the use of the name
saraya.ps. Once they received their domain name, PIJ needed to find an ISP
66 Id.
67 id.
68 Transcript of Discussion with Evan Kohlmann, International Terrorism Consultant, Al
Qaeda and the Internet (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2005/08/05/DI2005080501262_pf.html [hereinafter Washington
Post).
69 See Marshall Brain, How Domain Name Servers Work, HowSTUFFWORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/dns.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
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to host their actual site. Because the DNR can trace the location of its do-
main names, 7 0 it is always able to track saraya.ps to its ISP.
Knowing this, the jihadists have begun not only switching ISPs, but
also changing domain names to avoid detection. This is because the DNR's
directory details each new ISP of a given name, the sites are often shut
down in quick succession by tracing the domain name to the next ISP. The
mere act of changing names is enough to thwart the tracking process and
begin the tedious hunting anew; however, it also results in a temporary loss
of the terrorist organization's ability to communicate with their followers.
Shutting Down DNRs
One step toward immobilizing the internet jihad is to ignore the ISP
and go straight to the DNR to shut down domain names themselves. Many
jihadist sites purchase their names from U.S.-based companies, and hence
would be easy to regulate. Once a site is identified as affiliated with a terror-
ist group, the DNR can be found without difficulty. Several sites, like
whois.com and godaddy.com, maintain a listing of DNRs for domain
names. 7' For example, after entering alhanein.com, number three on Weis-
burd's current top twelve list of terrorist websites, the search turns up Fast
Domain, Inc., a DNR based out of Utah.72
Once a domain name is shut down, the site no longer appears in
web searches. Web crawlers, such as Google and Yahoo! Search, limit their
crawl space with rules. These rules forbid search returns of IP addresses,
limiting returns to domain names only. Hence, jihadist networks without
domain names would be crippled by an inability to recruit interested parties
who use such web crawlers to search the internet.73
Nevertheless, interet companies have proven that, due to the nature
of the web business, they can neither be forced nor expected to police the
hundreds of thousands of websites with which they are affiliated.7 4 For ex-
70 See Richard Keyt, Who Owns Your Domain Name?, KEYT LAW, May 1, 2001,
http://www.keytlaw.com/urls/whoowns.htm.
71 See WHOIS, http://www.whois.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2007); See also GoDaddy,
http://www.godaddy.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
72 See generally, The "Top Ten Twelve" List of Arabic Salafyist/Jihadist Forums,
INTERNET HAGANAH, http://intemet-haganah.org/hmedia/27apr07/27apr07-salafy forums.
html (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
73 See generally Rules to Limit the Web Crawl Space, IBM, 2005,
http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/wsiihelp/v8r3/index.jsp?topic-=/com.ibm.websphere
.ii.esearch.ad.doc/administering/iiysacweblim.htm (explaining how crawl space can be li-
mited).
74 Network Solutions Shuts Down Pedophile Website, HOSTSEARCH, 2007,
www.hostsearch.com/news/networksolutions_news 5782.asp (stating "[w]e host over 7.4
million domain names, and we sell packages where we host the content of a site, so we have
hundreds of thousands of sites that we host.").
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ample, in 2004 the American company, Network Solutions, hosted PIJ. 75
When a current customer complained about the company's support of a
terrorist organization, the company's response was "Network Solutions has
no responsibility or duty to police the rights of trademark owners concern-
ing domain names. 76 Network Solutions further added, "If the domain
owner in question is conducting criminal activity we would ask you to defer
to either the police or the proper authorities. 77
Despite the difficulties associated with shutting down websites, and
the impossibility of eliminating the entire terrorist web presence, there are
good reasons to make efforts. While some companies may be unwilling to
cut off their clients, others may simply be unaware that they are hosting
terrorist websites. In 2005, Weisburd alerted the U.S. government that forty-
eight Iranian government websites, including the official website of Iran's
Supreme Leader, were hosted by the American company CI Host.78 Because
of a trade embargo enacted in 1980, U.S. companies are not permitted to be
in business with Iran, which has been denoted by President Bush as being a
member of the "Axis of Evil. 79 CI Host was unaware that they were host-
ing such clients, and immediately shut down all forty-eight sites once they
were informed of the issue.80
The Problem and the Lack of a Coherent Strategy
Shutting down websites hosted within the United States is possible,
but companies are sometimes reluctant to do so. Consider again the example
of PIJ and one of their websites, qudsway.net. This site is hosted in Iran and
has a domain name registered with a U.S. company, Network Solutions.
The most direct and effective option for shutting the site down
would be to enlist the cooperation of Iran as the law enforcement arm in the
country where the site is hosted. Since Iranians are the main backers of the
PIJ, however, any attempt to work with them would be unsuccessful. The
only other option would require Network Solutions to sever PIJ's registra-
tion with the domain name qudsway.net. Weisburd tried to shut the website
down by contacting Network Solutions, but he met with serious resistance.
A representative of Network Solutions sent him the following message:
75 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Shutting Down Cyber-Terror, FRONTPAGE MAG., Oct. 21, 2004,
available at http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15605.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See Todd Bensman & Robert Riggs, Top Iranian Government Websites Discovered on
N. Texas Internet Company, CBS- Il NEWS (Dallas), Jun. 13, 2005,
http://cbsl ltv.com/localnews//localstory_164173338.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
79 Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (Apr. 7, 1980).
80 See Bensman, supra note 78.
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In reviewing your site located at http://haganah.org.il/haganah/ I noted that
my company is called out as being a company that is keeping qudsway.net
online. Honestly, do you really think that there is not a good reason that
the site is still up. Use your brain, I know that you must be more intelligent
than your posts would have people believe. I find blogs like yours loath-
some because you are criticizing the actions of a company when you have
no idea what is actually happening.
81
As one can infer from the Network Solutions message, there may be "good
reasons" that the website was still up. Perhaps the government chose to
monitor the site and requested Network Solutions keep the site in operation,
or it may just represent the lack of a clear policy. 82 Either way, qudsway.net
continues to flourish.
While it would certainly consume substantial government resources
to attempt to shut down individual websites, service providers can shut
down sites and domain names with relative ease.83 Many of these service
providers do not even physically house the servers. Rather, they provide an
IP address and network access. 84 As Professor Orin Kerr points out, howev-
er, there are serious flaws in assuming that ISPs can monitor and control
their property like a physical property owner, who can monitor and control
their property. 85 Kerr states that "[t]he common theme is that computer
owners can know and control what is happening within their networks; civil
liability can lead to less crime because computer owners have the power
(and, with civil liability, the incentive) to minimize criminal activity. 86 He
states that the problem with this reasoning is that
[C]omprehensive ISP monitoring appears to be extremely difficult, even
putting aside the very important privacy questions it raises. ISPs can have
hundreds of thousands or even millions of customers; it is very difficult
and time consuming for an ISP to watch just one or two customers in a
comprehensive way; and it is easy for any customer to circumvent or de-
feat ISP monitoring. 87
81 Qudsway.net: Proof that the United States and Iran *Can* Act Cooperatively,
INTERNET HAGANAH, May 14, 2006, available at
http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005605.html.
82 See id.
83 See Send Your Complaints to 71 Hayarkon Street, INTERNET HAGANAH, May 22, 2006,
http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005614.html.
84 See PIJ Site, supra note 4.
85 Orin Kerr, Virtual Crime, Virtual Deterrence: A Skeptical View of Self Help, Architec-
ture, and Civil Liability, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 197, 211 (2005).
86 id.
87 Id. at 212.
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Kerr has accurately stated the common theme-a theme related to my pro-
posal. Nevertheless, my proposal is distinguishable from his suggesting civil
liability, as mine adds both a notification requirement and watch dog moni-
toring. Thus, while sifting through websites for terrorist activities is beyond
the reasonable capability of service providers, they would have no difficulty
shutting down websites or domain names upon notification by government
officials or third party monitors. Notwithstanding this, without some threat
of penalty, be it criminal sanction, civil penalty, or shaming, there is little
incentive for the service providers to act after notification.
Material Support Statute as a Tool to Stop the Internet Jihad
Following September 11, 2001, Congress and the justice system re-
sponded to the threat of terrorism through a dramatic increase in prosecu-
tions under the material support statutes. 88 The material support statutes
have been two of the most frequently charged terrorism related offenses
since 9/11, culminating in ninety-two individuals facing allegations that
they violated either Section 2339A or Section 2339B.8 9 One of the key as-
pects of the material support statutes is their independence from any specific
event, creating a separate offense for those attempting to support terrorism.
Furthermore, they allow the charges to be made early in the terrorist plot.90
Section 2339A provides the government with tools to prosecute individuals
and organizations that are actively supporting terrorist activities, either fi-
nancially or otherwise. Expanding this concept of material support, Con-
gress enacted Section 2339B, which focused on "providing material support
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations." The two statutes
share the definition of "material support" found in Section 2339A and in-
corporated by reference into Section 2339B.
Section 2339A was originally passed in the early 1990s after the
first bombing of the World Trade Center while Congress was actively seek-
ing a way to cut off funds given for the support of terrorist actions.91 The
purpose of Section 2339A is to stop the furnishing of resources to any indi-
vidual or group with the knowledge or intention that it be used to lend sup-
port to any of more than two dozen different terrorist activities.92 Within
88 Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands
of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,20 (2005).
89 See id
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(c) (2000) ("Whenever it appears to the Secretary of the Attorney
General that any person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, any act that constitutes, or
would constitute, a violation of this section, the attorney General may initial civil action in a
district court of the United States to enjoin such violation.").
91 See Chesney, supra note 88, at 12-13.
92 Listed offenses include: knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for,
or in carrying out, a violation of: 18 U.S.C.S. § 32 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2007) (destruc-
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Section 2339A, material support is defined as any property, tangible or in-
tangible, or service, including expert advice or assistance and communica-
tions equipment.
The scope of Section 2339A is often considered to be very narrow
and unattainable by practical standards. 93 Thus, only a short period after
Section 2339A was passed, Congress added Section 2339B, making it a
tion of aircraft or aircraft facilities); 18 U.S.C.S. § 37 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2007) (vi-
olence at international airports); 18 U.S.C.S. § 81 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2007) (arson
within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C.S. § 175 (LexisNexis 1993 &
Supp. 2007) (biological weapons offenses); 18 U.S.C.S. § 229 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp.
2007) (chemical weapons offenses); 18 U.S.C.S. § 351 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2007)
(congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and kidnapping); 18 U.S.C.S. §
831 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2007) (nuclear material offenses); 18 U.S.C.S. § 842(m)
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) (plastic explosives offenses); 18 U.S.C.S. § 844(f)(i) (Lex-
isNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) (burning or bombing federal property or property used in inter-
state or foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C.S. § 903(c) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) (killing
or attempted killing of another during an attack on a federal facility with a dangerous wea-
pon); 18 U.S.C.S. § 956 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) (conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or
maim overseas); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1114 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (killing of attempted
killing of federal officers and employees); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1116 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp.
2007) (murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally pro-
tected persons); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1203 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (hostage taking); 18
U.S.C.S. § 1361 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of federal property); 18
U.S.C.S. § 1362 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of communication lines,
stations, or systems); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1363 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of
property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 1366 (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of an energy facility); 18 U.S.C.S. §
1751 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (presidential assassination or kidnapping); 18
U.S.C.S. § 1992 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (wrecking trains); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1993
(LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2155 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of
national defense material); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2156 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (production
of defective national defense material); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1280 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007)
(violence against maritime navigation); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2281 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007
(violence against maritime fixed platforms); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp.
2007) (violence against Americans overseas); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332(a) (LexisNexis 1991 &
Supp. 2007) (weapons of mass destruction); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp.
2007) (multinational terrorism); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332f (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007)
(bombing public places or facilities); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007)
(torture); 42 U.S.C.S. § 2284 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2007) (sabotage of nuclear facilities
or fuel); 49 U.S.C.S. § 46502 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007) (aircraft piracy); 49 U.S.C.S.
§ 60123(b) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007) (destruction of gas pipeline facilities); or any
offense listed in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332(b)(g)(5)(B) (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2007) (except for
sections 2339A and 2339B), or in preparation for, or in carrying out the concealment of an
escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both, and if the
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
93 See JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FrNANcING, 31-32 (2004); available at http://www.9-
11 commission.gov/staff statements/911_TerrFinMonograph.pdf.
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crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to a specifically
"designated foreign terrorist organization." 94 Because Section 2339B does
not require that support be tied to a specific terrorist act as in Section
2339A, the material support statute's applicable use is significantly broa-
dened by providing a way to prosecute indirect terrorist conduct. Further-
more, Section 2339B only requires that the "defendant knowingly provide
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization." 95 If a do-
nor gives a designated foreign terrorist organization material support of the
kind listed in the statute, even if it is meant to be used for peaceful non-
violent means, the donor is still in violation of Section 2339B. The policy
position is that all support, regardless of its intended use when given to a
designated terrorist organization, will ultimately free funds that can be used
to further violent terrorist activities.96
Section 2339B is the most used of the two material support statutes,
as well as the most debated. Defendants often challenge section 2339B on
the constitutional basis of freedom of association and the due process
clause. Challengers claim that the right of association includes the right to
support that idea or group through the donation of money and goods. In
Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales (HLP) the defendants claimed that
without a specific intent requirement written into Section 2339B, the statute
violates the Fifth Amendment. 97 The plaintiffs relied upon precedent set by
Scales v. United States.98 Scales was a conviction based on the Smith Act,
which specifically criminalized being a member in an organization whose
goal was to overthrow the government. 99 The court in HLP disagreed with
Scales, stating Section 2339B is fundamentally different by not criminaliz-
ing the membership, but instead the actions which would "materially sup-
port" the group's intentions. 100 The effect of this distinction is that the court
found that the specific intent requirement does not defeat the purpose and
constitutionality of Section 2339B.
Although the validity of the statute itself has been upheld, courts
have found portions of the statute to be impermissibly vague. In US v. Sat-
tar, a terrorist organization called the Islamic Group (IG) operated within
the United States as a radical Islamic group opposing any "infidels" who did
94 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a)(1) (2000).
95 Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F.Supp.2d 609, 625 (E.D.N.Y., 2006)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. §2339B (1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
96 S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 at 65 (1995), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 104.congbills&docid=f:s390is.txt.pdf.
97 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (C.D.Cal.
2005).
9' See id at 1143.
99 See id. at 1144.
'oo See id. at 1145.
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not agree with either the IG's interpretation of Islamic law or the sentence
and detention of the Islamic leader of the IG, Sheikh Abdel Rahman.101 The
indictment against the defendants included a charge of facilitating corres-
pondence between Rahman and third parties, namely other IG leaders.
102
The court found that the "provision of communications equipment" was
unconstitutional because "a criminal defendant simply could not be ex-
pected to know that the conduct alleged was prohibited by the statute."10 3 In
addition, the court in Sattar stated the "provision" of "personnel" was also
interpreted as impermissibly vague due to the lack of notice or standards for
its application.1°4 Nevertheless, the court denied the defendant's claim that
the statute was also overbroad and thus unconstitutional in light of its
sweeping purpose and applicability.105 Section 2339B is content-neutral,
and Congress has the ability to prohibit the "supply of tangible support."
10 6
Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
A variety of lists compiled by U.S. government agencies designate
groups or individuals as terrorists. 10 7 The Secretary of State has the power to
declare a group a "foreign terrorist organization" (FTO) pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1189. The Secretary is authorized to make such a designation if
three conditions are met: (1) the organization is foreign, (2) the organization
engages in terrorist activity, and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the secu-
rity of U.S. citizens or the national security of the United States.'08 If the
Secretary fmds that the organization meets these requirements, the Secretary
can add the organization to the FTO list by informing Congress seven days
before the designation, and then publishing a notice in the Federal Regi-
strar.' 09 As of October 2005, there have been forty-two listed foreign terror-
ist organizations identified."0
Section 2339B(g)(6) defines the term "terrorist organization" as "an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the
U.S. v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
102 Idat 355.
103 Id. at 358 (citing U.S. v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104 (2d. Cir. 2002)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 361-62.
'o' Id. at 362.
107 See AUDREY KuRTH CRONIN, THE "FTO LIST" AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING
DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RE 32120
3-5 (October 21, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf.
'o' 8 U.S.C. § 1 189(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
'09 Id. § I 189(a)(2)(A).
110 See OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION (FTO) (Oct. 11, 2005) http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.
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Immigration and Nationality Act" which is codified at 18 U.S.C. 1189.
Once an organization has been designated an FTO, the effects of that desig-
nation are in two important areas: finance and immigration."' Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, it is a crime to do-
nate money, assets, or any other "material support" to a designated FTO."
2
Members of an FTO are also forbidden from entering the country and, if
already present, are often subject to removal." 13 Furthermore, if any bank or
financial institution finds that it controls an FTO's money or has interests in
the FTO's assets, they must retain possession of, or control over, the funds
and report them to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury. 14 Most importantly, Section 2339B applies specifi-
cally to any donation of "material support" to a designated FTO on the State
Department's list." 15
The U.S. Department of the Treasury compiles its own list of terror-
ist organizations, but the list also includes individuals designated as terror-
ists 1 16 Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, all property, and interests in
property, within the United States owned by certain persons are blocked.
According to the U.S. Department of Treasury website,1 7 these per-
sons/organizations include: (1) foreign individuals or entities listed in the
Annex to E.O. 13224;' 18 (2) foreign individuals or entities that "have com-
mitted or . . .pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign poli-
cy, or economy" of the United States;" 9 (3) individuals or entities that ei-
ther are "owned or controlled by" or "act for or on behalf of' those parties
already designated under sub-sections 1(a), l(b), 1(c), or l(d)(i) of E.O.
13224;120 (4) individuals or entities that "assist in, sponsor, or provide fi-
nancial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services
to or in support of such acts of terrorism or those" parties already designated
under E.O. 13224;121 and (5) individuals or entities that are "otherwise asso-
ciated" with those parties already designated under sub-sections 1(a), 1(b),
"ll CRONIN, supra note 107, at CRS-2-3.
112 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) (2000).
113 CRONIN, supra note 107, at CRS-3.
114 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
.". 18 U.S.C § 2339B.
116 See CRONIN, supra note 107, at CRS-4
117 Treas. Dep't Designations, http://www.ustreas.gov/officesenforcement/designations.
shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 20007).
118 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III
2000).
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id
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1(c), or l(d)(i), of E.O. 13224.22 This list includes the criteria the Depart-
ment of State uses to determine whether or not to block financial assets of
terrorists and their affiliated members. There are currently over three hun-
dred persons identified as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" (SDGT)
including the original "specially designated terrorists" list.1
23
The main distinction between the Department of State's FTO list
and the Department of Treasury's SDGT list is the lack of an immigration
element.124 Another distinguishing feature of the SDGT list is that the de-
signation has no time limit, while the designation of an FTO contains a pro-
vision for re-evaluation after five years (if one has not been petitioned for
before that time). 125 Furthermore, the lists are founded in separate legisla-
tion, and each department takes the lead on adding new organizations or
individuals to their respective lists. 126 Currently, the SDGT list contains
more than two hundred organizations and individuals who have had their
assets frozen under E.O. 13224.127
The FTO list has been challenged as facially unconstitutional for
denying groups their right to due process. In U.S. v. Rahmani, the court de-
cided that the legislation's restriction on a court's ability to review the con-
stitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 1189 was impermissible.' 28 The court went on to
declare that a group's exclusion from and inability to challenge their desig-
nation as an FTO denied them due process.' 29 On appeal, the circuit court
overruled the first finding because "[m]any administrative determinations
are reviewable only by petition to the correct circuit court.0 30 The circuit
court also held that a third party does not have the power to challenge the
designation on a constitutional due process basis.13' Therefore, while the
systems have been challenged and critiqued, the court has generally held
that the designation of organizations as terrorist organizations is facially
constitutional.
122 id.
123 CRONIN, supra note 107, at CRS-4.
124 See id.
125 8 U.S.C. § 1189(4)(C) (Supp. 2004).
126 See CRONIN, supra note 107, at CRS-4.
127 Office of Foreign Asset Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Block Persons,
Dep't. of Treasury (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/sdn/tI 1 sdn.pdf.
128 See U.S. v. Rahmani, 209 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
129 See id. at 1058.
130 U.S. v. Afshari, 446 F3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).
131 Id. at 1155.
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Treasury Regulations and IEEPA as Tools
The Treasury's authority to confront and counter terrorists in cyber-
space stems largely from the powers provided to the President by IEEPA.
The IEEPA allows the President to declare a national emergency in re-
sponse to a threat to national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States. With such a declaration the President can exercise a broad set
of powers including blocking property, investigating, and regulating and
prohibiting transactions.132 On September 23, 2001, President Bush invoked
this power, declaring a national emergency with respect to the threat posed
by al-Qaida, and issued E.O. 13224, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support
Terrorism."'
133
The Order included an initial list of twenty-seven targets, including
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.134 In addition, it provided that the Secreta-
ries of State and Treasury could add specified categories of persons (indi-
viduals and entities) to the list.1'3 The categories of individuals and entities
"designatable" by the Secretary of the Treasury are:
(a) persons determined to be owned or controlled by, or to act for, or on
behalf of, those persons either listed in the Annex to the EO [Executive
Order] or determined to be subject to the EO;
(b) persons determined to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material,
or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support
of, those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be sub-
ject to this order;
(c) persons determined to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material,
or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support
of, acts of terrorism as defined by the EO, or
(d) persons determined to be otherwise associated with those persons listed
in the Annex to the EO order or those persons determined to be subject to
the EO. 1
36
Placement on the list requires U.S. persons, which for purposes of
this article would also include ISPs and DNRs, to block property and inter-
ests in property-including "services of any nature whatsoever,"'3 7 belong-
ing to the designated sanctions targets. 138 In addition, U.S. persons are also
132 Id. §§ 1701- 02 at 232, 253, 262.
133 Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 118.
134 Id. at Annex.
135 See id. at § 1.
136 See id. §§ I(c), (d)(i).
' 31 C.F.R. § 594.309 (2006).
118 Id. at § 594.301.
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prohibited under E.O. 13224 (and its implementing regulations) from en-
gaging in "any transaction or dealing ... in [blocked] property or interests
in property," including the provision of services to or for the benefit of per-
sons designated pursuant to the E.O. 1
39
This means that Treasury Regulations may be an extremely effec-
tive tool in countering the internet jihad. Those companies organized under
the laws of the United States, or any ISPs physically located in the United
States, are thus prohibited by law from providing internet service to or for
the benefit of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and any other entities or
individuals designated pursuant to the Order.
Furthermore, treasury regulations found in 31 C.F.R. § 594, as well
as those available on Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) internet
homepage, 140 also apply to potential sanctions for internet providers sup-
porting jihadist websites. 141 According to OFAC guidance, those who wish
"39 Id. at § 594.406.
140 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control: Mission,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
141 § 594.201 Prohibited transactions involving blocked property.
(a) ... property and interests in property of... persons [designated pursuant to E.O.
13224] that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or
that hereafter come within the possession or control of U.S. persons, including their
overseas branches, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn
or otherwise dealt in..."
§ 594.204 Prohibited transaction or dealing in property; contributions of funds, goods, or
services.
Except as otherwise authorized, no U.S. person may engage in any transaction or deal-
ing in property or interests in property of persons whose property or interests in prop-
erty are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a), including but not limited to the making or
receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of per-
sons whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a).
§ 594.309 Property; property interest.
The terms property and property interest include, but are not limited to ... services of
any nature whatsoever..."
§ 594.406 Provision of services.
(a) ... the prohibitions on transactions or dealings involving blocked property con-
tained in §§ 594.201 and 594.204 apply to services performed in the United States or
by U.S. persons, wherever located, including by an overseas branch of an entity located
in the United States:
(1) On behalf of orfor the benefit of a person whose property or interests in prop-
erty are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a); or
(2) With respect to property interests subject to §§ 594.201 and 594.204.
(b) Example: U.S. persons may not.. .provide legal, accounting, financial, brokering,
freight forwarding, transportation, public relations, educational, or other services to
a person whose propery or interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a).
§ 594.409 Charitable contributions.
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to provide services to targets of Treasury sanctions may not do so without
ex ante case by case authorization by Treasury.1 42 The potential civil penal-
ties for violations of IEEPA regulations is $250,000.143
Acting pursuant to these authorities, the Treasury may issue Cease
and Desist orders (C&Ds) to U.S.-based internet companies providing ser-
vices in violation of existing sanctions programs. '44 The C&Ds would be
issued pursuant to IEEPA, E.O. 13224 (or possibly E.O. 13438), 14' and 31
C.F.R. § 594. If systematically employed as part of a long-term program
targeting terrorist websites, jihadists will be forced to seek domain names
and ISPs from overseas hosts.
Under the same laws and regulations, OFAC can also demand in-
formation from internet service providers' client lists, such as those clients
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control by or
pursuant to this part, no charitable contribution or donation of funds, goods, services,
or technology, including those to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, or
medicine, may be made to or for the benefit of a person whose property or interests in
property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201 (a). (emphasis added).
142 See O.F.A.C. Guidance Ltr., 030606-FACRL-IA-07 (June 3, 2003) (providing interpret-
ative guidance on Iranian Transaction Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 560, on the provision of Inter-
net Connectivity Services and is persuasive with regard to the interpretation of Global Ter-
rorism Sanctions Regulations).
143 Press Release, Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Civil Penal-
ties-Interim Policy (Nov. 27, 2007) available at www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
civpen/penalties/interimpol_l 1272007.pdf. ("On October 16, 2007, the President signed
into law the International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act ('IEEPA En-
hancement Act' or 'Act'), Pub. L. No. 110-96, which, inter alia, increased the maximum
civil penalty applicable to violations of orders or regulations issued under IEEPA. The new
maximum civil penalty is the greater of $250,000 or an amount that is twice the amount of
the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is im-
posed.").
144 See Statement by Assistant Sec'y Juan Zarate Before the United Nations Sec. Council
1267 Sanctions Comm., JS-2189 (Jan. 10, 2005) available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/j s2l89.htm.
145 See Exec. Order No. 13,438, 27 Fed. Reg. 39,719 (Jul. 19, 2007) available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13438.pdf. The E.O. provides that
"the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense," may designate persons determined: "(i) to have committed,
or to pose a significant risk of committing, an act or acts of violence that have the
purpose or effect of: (A) threatening the peace or stability of Iraq or the Govern-
ment of Iraq; or (B) undermining efforts to promote economic reconstruction and
political reform in Iraq or to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people;
(ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistic-
al, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of
violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pur-
suant to this order; or (iii) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or pur-
ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order." Id.
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receiving domain names or web-hosting. 146 Signing up for an account with
an ISP generally involves providing your name, address, telephone number,
and billing information, which invariably includes a credit card number.
147
The example of Irhabi007 supports this; investigators there found stolen
credit card information and confirmed that the cards were used to pay
American internet providers, on whose servers Irhabi007 had posted jihadi
propaganda. 148 According to the Washington Post, that lead demonstrated to
authorities that "they had netted the infamous hacker.',
149
Shaming and Watch-Dog Groups: Steps Short of Using the Statute
Despite the fact that designated foreign terrorist organizations are
publicly listed on the Department of State and Department of Treasury web-
sites, internet companies are either undeterred by the threat of prosecution,
or are unaware of their client's terrorist status. As such, and as the PIJ ex-
ample illustrates, these companies continue to do business with them. The
material support statute may be a means for government officials to shut
down the phenomenon of cyber jihad, although doing so would be an ex-
treme step.
While the government has a legitimate interest in keeping terrorists
from recruiting, they do not want to be seen as attempting to censor the in-
ternet. A wiser interim policy is to persuade internet service providers and
domain name registrars to voluntarily take down or suspend services when
those services are assisting terrorist organizations. Network Solutions,
which I wrote critically about earlier in the article, often avoids acknowl-
edging the fact that it has retained through their User Policy Agreement, the
ability to regulate and take down a site that it deems "unlawful," "threaten-
146 31 C.F.R. § 501.602 ("Every person is required to furnish under oath, in the form of
reports or otherwise, from time to time and at any time as may be required by the Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control, complete information relative to any transaction, regard-
less of whether such transaction is effected pursuant to license or otherwise, subject to the
provisions of this chapter or relative to any property in which any foreign country or any
national thereof has any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect. The Director
may require that such reports include the production of any books of account, contracts,
letters or other papers connected with any such transaction or property, in the custody or
control of the persons required to make such reports. Reports with respect to transactions
may be required either before or after such transactions are completed ... the Director may,
through any person or agency, conduct investigations, hold hearings, administer oaths, ex-
amine witnesses, receive evidence, take depositions, and require by subpoena the attendance
and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, and documents relating
to any matter under investigation, regardless of whether any report has been required or filed
in connection therewith.").
147 JOHN R. LEVINE, ET AL., THE INTERNET FOR DuMMIEs 60 (7th ed. 2000).
148 Rita Katz & Michael Kern, Terrorist 007, Exposed, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at B 1.
149 Id.
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ing," or which "constitutes an illegal threat, hate propaganda, profane, inde-
cent or otherwise objectionable material of any kind or nature." 150 Of
course, Network Solutions is not the only web service provider that hosts
extremist websites, another site based in Dallas, thePlanet.com has also
been accused of hosting three different PIJ websites, as well as a Hamas
monthly news magazine, each run by designated FTOs.' 5'
Because it is difficult for companies and the government to monitor
whom internet services are being provided to, independent watch-dog sites
stand in the best position to fill the gap. A number of watch-dog sites al-
ready monitor the internet for terrorist activity and information. This brings
me back to the example of Internet Haganah. While Internet Haganah is
primarily run by Weisburd out of his home, it enjoys the help of groups
from around the world. 152 After finding a terrorist website, Weisburd deter-
mines which internet companies are providing the site support and either
"shames service providers into shutting down the sites that host them or
gathers what he terms 'intel' for interested parties."'1 53 These interested par-
ties include both government and private entities.1 54 Internet Haganah en-
courages individuals to take action by learning about both the terrorist web-
site and the group, understanding the terms of service of the host company,
and finally making a calm, informed complaint to the company. 155 Often
these complaints go unanswered, at which point Internet Haganah recom-
mends that an individual go to the local media for publicity. 56 No company
wants to see its name smeared across the morning news as a supporter of
terrorism, especially in their key market.
57
Tactics such as these have successfully encouraged sites to take
down other questionable material, such as websites that cater to pedophiles.
For example, in April 2007, Network Solutions shut down a website after
receiving complaints from customers. 5 8 The site had been publicly broad-
150 Network Solutions Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/
aup.jsp (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
151 Dallas Server Company Carries Zarqawi Death Videos, Terrorist Websites (CBS-1I
television broadcast Nov. 14, 2004), available at http://haganah.org.il/hmedia/press-
15nov04-cbs I 1-dallas.pdf.
152 Labi, supra note 65, at 104.
153 Id.
154 id.
'.. See Confronting the Global Jihad Online: What Can You Do, INTERNET HAGANArl,
Nov. 18, 2004, http://internet-haganah.com/harchives/003133.html.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 See Network Solutions Shuts Down Pedophile Website, HoSTSEARCI, Apr. 7, 2007.
www.hostsearch.com/news/networksolutionsnews_5782.asp.
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casted in the Bellingham Herald newspaper, prompting the complaints. 159
Company spokeswoman, Susan Wade, responded by saying that although
there is no way they could possibly "police the content of everything that's
going up because hosting providers can sell thousands of sites a day," they
appreciate when third parties get involved or "when we get served legal
papers that say, 'Hey, take a look at this."'1 60
What Impact Will Using the Statute Have on the Internet Jihad?
When shaming, complaints, and bad publicity fail, government offi-
cials may need to bring legal action against companies that are providing
support to terrorist organizations. The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs has conducted hearings on violent Is-
lamic extremism, covering various aspects of the problems including how
the internet fosters recruitment and propaganda dissemination. 161 At the
hearings, the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy
Institute endorsed the use of "[1]egal means for disrupting extremist use of
the Internet[, which] may be useful against websites that directly advocate
violence or provide material support to known terrorist organizations, cross-
ing the line from protected speech to illegal acts of violence.' 62 The House
of Representatives has also begun to take notice of the presence of terrorism
on the internet. House Resolution 224 has been referred to committee, call-
ing on all corporate owners of websites that share user-posted videos to take
down terrorist and jihadist propaganda. 163 Yet, even without this express
resolution, the government already has a powerful legal tool available in the
form of Section 2339.
Prosecutors can use Section 2339 to stop U.S. internet providers
from providing their services as "material support" to FTOs. Ignoring the
threat of prosecution exposes companies to prison, fines, and significant
public outcry. Section 2339 holds that if a person is found to have material-
ly supported a designated foreign terrorist organization, they "shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life. ' 164 While to date no case has been brought against an ISP, a plain read-
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamic Fundamentalism Before the S. Comm. On
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 10th Cong. (2007) available at
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-af/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=44 1.
162 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIv. HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST. ET AL., NETWORKED
RADICALIZATION: A COUNTER-STRATEGY 20 (2007) available at http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter/2OStrategy.pdf.
163 H.R. Res. 224. 110th Cong. (2007).
164 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp.).
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ing of the statute suggests that those who provide services to terrorist web-
sites have satisfied the definition of providing "material support."'
' 65
While most prosecutions under the Section 2339 have centered
upon individuals who have physically provided material support, either
through the provision of objects such as weaponry or funding, the statute
has only recently been used to prosecute individuals who use computers and
the internet as a means of providing material support. 166 In 2004, The Dis-
trict Court of Connecticut indicted Babar Ahmad on terrorism charges in-
cluding a violation of Section 2339A, providing material support.' 67 The
charges allege that Ahmad created websites in order to "recruit mujahideen,
raise funds for violent jihad, recruit personnel . . . solicit military items,"
and to give instructions on how to travel to Pakistan to fight for the Taliban,
and for the "surreptitious transfer of funds" to terrorist groups. 168 Some of
the websites opened and maintained by Ahmad were serviced through a
U.S. company, OLM, which was headquartered in Connecticut at the
time. 1
69
The Ahmad case proves that a material support prosecution for pro-
viding internet services is at least conceivable; yet, no such actions have
been brought against intemet service providers. This is likely due to the fact
that most companies want to cooperate, and when they are reluctant to do
so, their reluctance is short-lived when faced with the threat of prosecution.
Despite the utility of threatening prosecution, there are legal chal-
lenges to successfully using the material support statute. Some may argue
that targeting internet service providers amounts to censorship by proxy.170
According to Professor Kreimer of the University of Pennsylvania:
165 See id.
166 See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 3-4, U.S. v. Lindh, No. 02-51-M (E.D.Va. 2002)
(claiming John Walker Lindh admitted to traveling to Pakistan to receive paramilitary train-
ing and traveling to Afghanistan to join the Taliban); Indictment at 86-94, U.S. v. AI-Arian,
No. 8:03-CR (M.D.Fla. 2003) (charging Sami Amin Al-Arian with conspiracy to provide
material support to Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi by raising funds for the organization);
Indictment at 10-20, U.S. v. Sattar, No. 02-Crim.-395 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (charging Ahmed
Abdel Sattar with conspiracy to provide material support to Islamic Gama'at by providing
telephone equipment, financing, and transportation); Indictment at 7-9, U.S. v. Babar
Ahmed, (D.Conn. 2004) (charging Babar Ahmed with conspiracy to provide material support
to AI-Qaida by maintaining internet accounts used to recruit members, solicit donations, and
communicate to a U.S. Naval enlistee encouraging "the enlistee to 'keep up the psychologi-
cal warefare [sic].').
167 Indictment at para. 18, U.S. v. Babar Ahmed (D. Conn. 2004).
161 Id. at para. 12.
169 Id. at para. 21A.
170 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment, Internet Inter-
mediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 11, 11 (2006).
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If unrestrained by First Amendment doctrine, the "material support" sta-
tutes, or other similar criminal prohibitions that might be adopted, will
threaten to recruit a federally conscripted corps of censors. Webmasters,
site owners, or technicians could find themselves the subjects of criminal
prosecution for facilitating the transmission of any message originating
with federally proscribed organizations. A risk-averse Internet interme-
diary would not need to descend into paranoia to conclude that the most
prudent course would be to proactively censor messages or links that
might prove problematic, and to respond to official "requests" with alacri-
ty.
17 1
Professor Kreimer goes on to argue that First Amendment protec-
tion should be read "at a minimum . . . [to] provide similar protection to
those who innocently associate with illicit actors or provide links in the
chain of communications over the Internet., 172 I do not disagree with Pro-
fessor Kreimer's assertion; in fact, this is why I argued above that the first
step should be, as some watchdog groups advocate, to first contact the in-
ternet company, then conduct a public shaming and media campaign. Only
when those methods fail should the government consider prosecuting those
companies who support terrorist websites. It is only then that the govern-
ment can argue that the company was aware of its support of terrorist organ-
izations. It is critical to bear in mind that the government in such a prosecu-
tion is not targeting the company's speech; it is instead targeting the com-
pany's provision of services to a designated terrorist organization.
Similarly, Treasury regulations have undergone First Amendment
scrutiny and survived. For example, an examination of case law involving
the constitutionality of OFAC actions involving First Amendment claims by
U.S. persons indicates that courts overwhelmingly rule in favor of the agen-
cy, especially when the cases involve counterterrorism-related enforcement
actions. As stated in a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision, "there is no
First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support terror-
ists.' 73 Despite this fact, the Treasury has not aggressively attempted to cut
off cyber-services to terrorism supporters-not even to key al-Qaida facili-
tators.
One example of Treasury action was the December 2006 designa-
tion of Kuwaiti Hamid al-Ali, a cleric who supported al-Qaeda in Iraq and
funded terrorist cells in Kuwait.1 74 At the time of Hamid al-Ali's designa-
171 Id. at 93-94.
172 Id. at 94.
173 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
see also Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 ("[T]here is no constitu-
tional right to facilitate terrorism [with materials or funding.]").
174 Press Release HP-191, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Designations Target Ter-
rorist Facilitators (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp 191.htm.
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tion, the Treasury, under Secretary Stuart Levey, declared that these "indi-
viduals support every stage of the terrorist life-cycle, from financing terror-
ist groups and activity, to facilitating deadly attacks, and inciting others to
join campaigns of violence and hate. The civilized world must stand united
in isolating these terrorists"'175 Rather than isolating these terrorists, howev-
er, Hamid al-Ali has continued to operate his website outside of Washington
state. 176 His operations have included the religious sanctioning of suicide
bombings and the incitement of individuals to "join the armed resistance of
the jihadi movement[.]"' 77
Two barriers to Treasury action may be found, not in the First
Amendment, but instead in decades old pieces of legislation. In 1988, Rep-
resentative Howard Berman (D-CA) proposed The Berman Amendment,
which limited the President's powers under IEEPA by creating an exemp-
tion for "informational materials.' 78 Also, in 1994 Congress passed the
Free Trade in Ideas Amendment which expanded the Berman Amendment
to non-tangible forms of information. 179 The Conference Report on the bill
stated that the language of the Berman Amendment was explicitly intended
to have broad scope.' 80
Given the age of these pieces of legislation, a case can be made that
their silence regarding terrorism and internet services supporting terrorism
may provide for an exception to their broad scope. Even in the absence of
an exception, one may argue that terrorist websites provide more than in-
formation, that is by allowing fundraising, training, recruiting, and opera-
tional details these websites provide "instrumental uses" that are distin-
guishable from "communicative uses.",
18
'
Moreover, in U.S. v. O'Brien,182 the Supreme Court declared thatgovernment actions which advance "sufficiently important governmental
175 Id.
176 Chris Heffelfinger, Kuwaiti Cleric Hamid al-Ali: The Bridge Between Ideology and
Action, 5 TERRORISM MONITOR 4, available at http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news
/article.php?articleid=2373349.
177 Id.
178 See The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988) ("The authority granted to the President in this subsection does not include
the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, the importation from any country,
whether commercial or otherwise, of publications, films.., or other informational materials.
...") (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(b)(4)) [hereinafter Berman Amendment].
179 Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525; see also,
Berman Amendment, supra, note 178.
o Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-482, at 483 (1994) (Conf. Rep.)).
181 See generally Weimann, supra note 35 (explaining many ways terrorist groups use the
internet, including training purposes).
'82 U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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interests" may allow for incidental limitations on the First Amendment for
speech and nonspeech. The O'Brien Court held that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the Constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on the alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
183
Federal Courts applying this test to OFAC activity have allowed the
Treasury to restrict the import of books from sanctioned nations.'8 4 Courts
have also upheld Presidential action on the grounds that barring provision of
financial support to terrorists was unrelated to suppression of free expres-
sion, and that any incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms were
"no greater than necessary." 85
Finally, Supreme Court precedent buttresses the view that not all
speech is protected. For example, speech which is likely to incite vi-
olence, 86 or which creates a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, 87 is unprotected. The content neutral nature of statutes, regulations and
other government activity that can counter the cyber jihad makes a success-
ful First Amendment challenge less likely. Accordingly, more government
action against terrorist websites and their supporters is necessary to counter
the cyber jihad and to fully define the limits of the First Amendment in this
critical area of governmental concern.
IV. A CYBER EMBARGO OF DESIGNATED MATERIAL SUPPORTERS
Even if the use of shaming and the threat of the material support
statute or Treasury regulations can be successful in driving j ihadist websites
from U.S.-based service providers, the jihadist web presence will still re-
main. As the PIJ example demonstrates, a terrorist organization may main-
tain its web presence by utilizing the services of foreign companies. These
companies are, in essence, providing material support, although they have
not yet been charged or convicted of the specific offense. Merely forcing
jihadist websites overseas is not a sufficient counterterrorism strategy given
the ubiquity of the internet, and the fact that sites hosted outside the United
' Id. at 377.
184 See Teague v. Reg'l Comm'r of Customs, Region II, 404 F.2d 441,445 (2d Cir. 1968).
185 Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F.Supp.2d 779, 806 (N.D.Ill. 2002),
(citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Palestine
Info. Office, 853 F.2d at 939-40; cf Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (D.C.Cir.
1991)).
186 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
187 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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States appear as seamlessly as those hosted within the United States. There-
fore, new policy and legal proscriptions are necessary to further counter the
cyber jihad.
An aggressive application of current statutes may suffice to counter
the cyber jihad by targeting "material supporters." The Department of the
Treasury's designation process, if liberally and aggressively applied, may
provide an adequate remedy. As detailed above, sub paragraph three of E.O.
allows the Department of the Treasury to block both property and interests
in property, which "act for or on behalf of' those parties already designated
as terrorist organizations. Furthermore, sub paragraph four allows similar
techniques to be applied to "individuals or entities that 'assist in, sponsor, or
provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or oth-
er services to or in support of 'such acts of terrorism or those parties already
designated."",188 A broad interpretation of these rules would result in the
blocking of both property and interests in property for "material suppor-
ters." In the PIJ example, the practical effect of this designation would be to
block the assets of Time Telekomm and the Malaysian network service pro-
vider supporting the PIJ website.
Nevertheless, this process is limited because these entities may not
have assets worth blocking. Thus, a true cyber embargo would entail creat-
ing a new process whereby those foreign communications companies that
provide material support to terrorist organizations may be designated as
"material supporters." Such a designation would prevent U.S. companies
from conducting business with designated entities. This process would
create virtual "persona non grata." The interconnected nature of the world
wide web necessitates that even those overseas companies that provide web
services to terrorist organizations (the material supporters) must still rely on
other web service providers, many of which are in the United States, to
communicate. This reliance is the weak link in the cyber jihadist's web
presence. Designating overseas web providers as "material supporters"
forces those companies to choose between either losing all commercial ser-
vices from the United States or continuing to provide services to the terror-
ist organization.
How would such a designation work? I propose amending the U.S.
Code to create a category of "designated material supporter." U.S. compa-
nies would be forbidden from engaging in commercial services with entities
bearing such a designation. The designation would include elements of the
material support statute, but would limit itself to internet companies. More-
over, the designation could include a provision that allows companies to
sever ties to terrorist organizations to avoid being designated a "material
supporter."
188 Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 118.
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Diplomatic efforts could further expand the cyber embargo. Initially
this diplomatic effort need not be expansive. Rather, it could focus on the
nine countries that control 95.58% of all registrars. 189 Preventing these regi-
strars from engaging in commercial activity with "material supporters"
would have a dramatic impact on the "designated material supporter," likely
forcing them out of business if they do not cease their ties to jihadists. Dip-
lomatic efforts have worked in the past, albeit on a small scale. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Department of Defense reportedly used its leverage to shut
down Palestinian resistance sites hosted by the Ukraine in 2004.190 In anoth-
er instance "the British government, responding to the U.S. request under
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the two countries, ordered the
closure of twenty media websites in seventeen countries that advocated ter-
rorism."'191 Working through diplomatic channels to shut down foreign
companies that serve as material supporters is the critical next step in coun-
tering the cyberjihad.
As each country cuts off internet support within their jurisdiction,
terrorist websites will be forced to find support in new jurisdictions. Con-
tinued monitoring and diplomatic efforts would thus remain critical. Addi-
tionally, because 95.8% of all domain registrars are located in nine countries
with which the United States has strong diplomatic ties, the internationaliza-
tion of these efforts is achievable. 92 Furthermore, internationalizing an
agreement that will ensure that other countries shut down "designated ma-
terial supporters" is the next step in countering the internet jihad.
Continuing diplomatic efforts to prohibit dealing with "designated
material supporters" will create a system whereby terrorist organizations
will have extremely limited choice of locations where they can register and
operate their websites. In most cases, the internet jihadists will be forced to
register in small, already ostracized countries such as Iran or Libya, which
maintain control over their respective .IR and .LY domain names. By limit-
ing internet jihadists to these countries, diplomatic measures, such as trade
189 Thirty-six countries have ICANN Accredited Registrars. Within those thirty-six countries
there are 522 Accredited Domain Name Registrars: 281 of which are located in the United
States (54%); 124 of which are located in Canada (28%); 16 of which are located in Germa-
ny (3.07%); 12 of which are located in the UK (2.3%); 11 of which are located in the ROK
(2.11%); 10 of which are located in Australia (1.9%); 8 of which are located in France
(1.53%); 8 of which are located in Japan (1.53%); 6 of which are located in Spain (1.14%).
ICANN-Accredited Registrars, http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
'90 Al Click, The Pentagon Closes Jihad Websites, GUERRILLA NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 29,
2004, available at http://alpinestar.grm.tv/headlines/547/ThePentagonClosesJihad_
Websites (last visited Oct. 19, 2007 (original on file with author).
191 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Shutting Down Cyberterror, Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.frontpage
magazine.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID= 15605.
192 See supra note 189.
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restrictions or even the dramatic step of blocking internet traffic to those
countries, can be brought to bear. Those countries that host jihadist websites
will then have to decide if they are willing to protect the internet jihadists at
the cost of losing their legitimate commercial internet traffic.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Given the ubiquity of the internet, and the challenges of tracking
down constantly moving websites, domain name registrars, and internet
service providers, one may be left to conclude that efforts to counter the
internet jihad are pointless. Nevertheless, the only truly effective way to
counter the internet jihad is to continually make efforts to shut them down.
Doing so can dramatically impact the terrorist web presence. For example,
Aaron Weisburd claims to have been responsible for shutting down 80% of
j ihadist websites. 193
The limited efforts of watchdog groups prove that the fight against
cyber jihadists is not a fruitless one. Through increased support of watchdog
groups, expanded shaming techniques, and the use of existing statutes, ter-
rorist websites can be forced to overseas service providers. This first step is
not enough, however, as the world wide web is dynamic, and the move to
overseas service providers will allow cyber jihadists to seamlessly maintain
their web presence. Thus, more aggressive use of existing designation tech-
niques, and the creation of a new "material supporter" designation are ne-
cessary to create a cyber embargo ofjihadist websites and those companies
that provide them services. Diplomatic efforts are necessary to fully realize
the potential of the cyber embargo, as cyber jihadists can continually move
and find new "material supporters" in other jurisdictions. Through contin-
ued diplomatic efforts, terrorist websites can be forced to exist in a geo-
graphically limited number of jurisdictions.
Furthermore, even if only some jihadist sites are closed down, the
jihadists will still be restricted to a few overseas hosts. These few hosts
would no longer be needles in a haystack; with fewer places to go, the major
jihadist sites with direct links to terrorism could be quickly identified and
monitored by investigators. 94 The end result of this process will not elimi-
nate the cyber jihadist presence, but geographically limiting terrorists allows
193 See Myth, Reality, and Jihadist Use of the Internet, INTERNET HAGANAH, Mar. 01, 2007,
http://internet-haganah.com/harchives/005928.html. (Weisburd claims an "80% mortality
rate" regarding those sites which his website archived. Those sites were shut down by asking
the service provider to discontinue the site; he refers to this as "active web site interdiction
efforts."); See also Ariana Eunjung Cha, Watchdogs Seek Out the Web's Bad Side, WASH.
POST, Apr. 25, 2005, at Al ("Weisburd said he and his supporters are responsible for disman-
tling at least 650 and as many as 1,000 sites he regards as threatening, especially Islamic
radical sites.").
194 See id.
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for government and civilian orchestrated monitoring, as well as for offen-
sive actions to shut down these sites. Some websites may, for intelligence
reasons, be identified as sites that the government will not want to shut
down. Instead, the government may choose to monitor or compromise these
sites as they may contain valuable intelligence information, such as user
names, locations, and messages that users believe to be encrypted but are in
fact being monitored. This technique is not universally accepted though, as
some contend "getting real actionable intelligence from a terrorist website
or forum is extremely difficult and requires a lot of time and a lot of luck[,]
and in many cases the small amounts of available actionable intelligence
would only be noticed after the act is done."' 95 Thus, geographically limit-
ing these sites will corral the cyber jihadists onto a limited number of web
servers, effectuating monitoring and other counterterrorism techniques.
While some may argue that the anonymity of the internet makes lo-
cating and shutting down jihadist websites too challenging, one must bear in
mind that jihadists use websites for the specific purpose of dispersing in-
formation and connecting with each other. To a large extent, jihadists are
forced to relinquish anonymity in order to reach their own audience. 96 In
addition, anonymity is a two-way street. Trackers and investigators can in-
filtrate the jihadist ranks by acting as interested jihadists, avoiding detection
197through anonymity.
The key to countering cyber jihad is to relentlessly target jihadist
websites by keeping them continually on the move, cutting off their re-
sources by targeting "material supporters," and finally limiting their poten-
tial areas of operation so that increased monitoring and other counterterror-
ism techniques can be applied to them. Following these steps will go a long
way toward addressing the technical and political issues inherent in the in-
ternet jihad, that have plagued lawmakers and policy experts.
195 Gordon, supra note 15.
196 See A. Aaron Weisburd. Global Jihad, the Internet and Opportunities or Counter-
terrorism Operation, INTERNET HAGANAH, Aug. 23, 2005. http://intemet-
haganah.com/harchives/004824.html.
197 See id.
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